|
Professor Anatoly Torkunov, Rector of MGIMO |
The purpose of writing is to communicate. To do this you
need to do two things beyond simply using
intelligible English. You need to say
something your readership does not know, and you need to say something that is
true (unless it is funny or interesting in some other way).
One of the most prestigious academics in Russia, Professor
Anatoly Torkunov, appears not to have learned either of these lessons very well. Prof.
Torkunov is the Rector of MGIMO, possibly the most respected of Russia’s
institutions of higher learning. He is also a member of the Russian Academy of
Science and is Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary—whatever that
means. He holds the Order of Merit for the Fatherland (only 3rd class,
admittedly), the Order of Honour, the Order of Friendship the Order of St
Sergio’s (2nd class) and the Order of Holy Prince Daniel of Moscow (3rd class
again).
But can he be depended upon to write an informative and
accurate paragraph on his special area of expertise? Apparently not.
Take the following text, for example. These are the first
and fourth paragraphs of an article by Professor Torkunov which was published
on the Russian International Affairs Council website, on 6 March this year,
under the heading
Education as a Soft Power Instrument of Russia’s ForeignPolicy. See if you can find any statements which are both informative and accurate
(the words I will discuss are underlined):
A New Leadership Resource in Today’s
World
Any nation in its foreign policy focuses on strengthening its
international positions and image, as well as creating a favorable external
environment for its country’s long-term socioeconomic growth. And while the foreign
policy toolkit used to accomplish this objective may change from epoch to epoch,
in the 20th century’s bipolar world, the dominant trend was for states
to concentrate on building up their hard power and their military and
economic might….
Today, political leadership in the world is increasingly
dependent on a nation’s ability to “nurture purposefully” its neighbours or
competitors. In times of transition in the global political system,
nations are fighting more and more over their right to define the values and
rules of this world order.
Looking at this in detail:
“Any
nation in its foreign policy focuses on strengthening its international
positions and image, as well as creating a favorable external environment for
its country’s long-term socioeconomic growth.”
This sentence is a statement of the obvious, so obvious
indeed that every nation does what Torkunov says. So why does he need to tell
us?
“And
while the foreign policy toolkit used to accomplish this objective may change
from epoch to epoch…”
Leaving aside the unattractively slangy use of the word
“toolkit” in such a context, these things change from year to year, or decade
to decade, but not from “epoch to epoch”. An epoch is a reference date not a
period of time. It is the first moment of a period, not the whole period. The
break-up of the Soviet Union was an epochal moment. It was the end of the
Soviet “era” and the beginning of the post-Soviet period, perhaps, but it was
an event without duration. Foreign policy “toolkits” do not change only at
epochal moments, but continuously as diplomatic relationships evolve.
“…the
20th century’s bipolar world…”
The 20th century was only “bi-polar” for
forty-six years, from 1945 to 1991, for the majority of the time it was either
multi-polar or uni-polar, even on the crudest understanding of the term. And if
you think of poles of attraction, the attraction of the Soviet Union was much
more short-lived than that. It started around 1943 when everyone realised how
many Germans the Soviets were killing, and ended in 1956 when most people came
to realise how many Hungarians they were prepared to kill to sustain the
illusion of equality with the West. The subsequent killing of so many Czechs,
Poles, Aghanistanis and dissident Russians drove that lesson home in even the
least imaginative minds.
“…building
up their hard power and their military and economic might…”
What is the difference between “hard power” and “military
and economic might”? The whole of Professor Torkunov’s article suggests he
defines hard power as military and economic might. So one or other is redundant.
“…political leadership in the world is increasingly
dependent on a nation’s ability to “nurture purposefully” its neighbours or
competitors…”
There is something madly illusional about this. Which
country is exercising “political leadership” in the way the rest of the
sentence implies? How do countries “nurture purposefully their neighbours or
competitors”? Is Russia “nurturing
purposefully” Kazakhstan, for example, or Georgia, or China? Is France
“nurturing” Germany, or Belgium or Spain? Is China “nurturing purposefully”
Japan or Mongolia, or North Korea? What is the good professor talking about?
“In
times of transition in the global political system…”
Whenever was the world political “system” not in a time of transition? When have international political
relations been fixed in the sort of stasis which Professor Torkunov seems to
think is their normal state? And why does he use the word “system” about a set
of relationships that are in constant flux, without any organising principle
which might render them predictable? That is what a system is. And that is what
global politics is not.
“…fighting more and more over their right to define
the values and rules of this world order…”
Which countries, exactly, are “fighting” to define values,
etc., other than, arguably, North Korea? There is something wearyingly
old-fashioned about the way so many Russians who achieved eminence under
Communism describe international relationships as having a military or violent
character. Have they learned nothing from the collapse of their own system of
militarism and violence? And what “world order” does Professor Torkunov see? I
see only a set of relationships of greater or lesser stability, but no “world
order”, which is another way of saying “system”. In the context of diplomatic
analysis, reference to methods of threat and aggression seem to me little more
than the atavistic fantasies of bombastic neo-Eurasianists of near-pensionable
age who don’t appear to understand that not even the United States is an
autonomous political entity any more—if ever it was.
So let me try to translate Professor Torkunov’s two windy
paragraphs into something accurate and more succinct:
Today, the foreign policy of most nations is evolving from a
twentieth century emphasis on the crude assertion of military and economic
power into an approach which emphasises constructive interaction between
countries based on competitive cultural self-promotion.
That may be shorter, but I don’t think I have left anything
out.